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Introduction 
A United Nations (UN) 2007 report on climate change forecasted “a turbulent twenty-
first century of rising seas, spreading drought and disease, weather extremes, and damage 
to farming, forests, fisheries and other economic areas” while reminding global leaders 
that the “challenge of halting climate change is one to which civilization must rise” 
(Associated Press 2007). Similarly, in the UN Environment Programme’s 2011 Annual 
Report (2012: 2 emphasis added), Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon insisted that 
“[a]ddressing inequalities, overcoming poverty, maintaining peace and building 
prosperity for the entire human family depend on rejecting the old economics of heedless 
pollution and the excessive exploitation of the world’s natural capital. … Environmental, 
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economic and social indicators tell us that our current model of progress is unsustainable”. 
Such seemingly straightforward exhortations, directed from an international organization 
to its member states, are emblematic of a discursive modality regarding development and 
its impact on the environment. But this language also invokes a particular vision of time 
important to global economic and environmental ethics issues by virtue of its historical 
implication in the constitution of the “West” and the “rest”. 
 
This paper examines discourses about common but differentiated responsibilities related 
to environmental equity and capacity as instantiations of temporality in international 
politics. Temporality serves as a legitimating and Othering device, quarantining the 
“underdeveloped” in unique and powerful ways. However, the temporality we identify is 
also one of the multiple sites of struggle that informs this volume. It provides an 
opportunity to challenge Western hegemony via environmental issues – what we title, 
following Brent Steele’s work on aesthetics and security, a form of “counter-power” - a 
challenge of the temporal discourse which demonstrates its “reversibility” (Steele 2010, 
46).   
 
We first discuss how three temporal aspects in a particular narrative about the unilinear-
progressive march of history toward Western modernity comprised an Othering device. 
Unified history, the temporal locations of Self and Other, and a human development 
metaphor served to associate industrialization and development with “progress” and 
marginalized indigenous and agricultural societies as “primitive” or “savage”. Next, we 
read environmental policy debates as a challenge to the hegemony of Western modernity 
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from within its own temporalized discourse. In pointing out that developed countries are 
historically responsible for a disproportionate amount of the world’s environmental 
problems (equity) and that other issues such as human poverty compete with 
environmental hazards for scarce national resources (capacity), developing countries 
mobilize the very temporal device that compelled their development as a rationale against 
their responsibility to do so in environmentally sustainable ways as well as against their 
duty to assist in environmental clean-up. We conclude by discussing the implications of 
this discourse for current thinking about time and global politics. In particular, we view 
temporalized environmental discourse as demonstrating the fragility of attempts to 
promulgate a unified vision of global political time.   
  
Temporal Othering 
Self and Other issues are no strangers to IR. They were central to the post-WWII realism 
of Reinhold Niebuhr (2001) and Hans Morgenthau (1948), and enjoyed renewed attention 
after the Cold War, when ethnic strife and national independence movements returned to 
the main stage of international affairs and social constructivist and identity research made 
inroads in IR (e.g. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996; McSweeney 1999; Wendt 1999). In most 
of these works, the delineation between Self and Other proceeded along primarily spatial 
lines. In essence, the Self encounters the Other at the boundaries of territorial sovereignty, 
between national cultures, or along the edges of ideological spheres of influence. 
 
In this section, we suggest how the temporal vision of Western modernity has been 
crucial to industrial modernization on a global scale. Such “progress” is largely 
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responsible for the environmental issues confronting the twenty-first century, and has 
been the impetus for dissident manoeuvres from less-developed, less-prosperous 
members of the international system. Understanding how those members have 
experienced a lengthy, temporalized disciplining at the hands of Western metropoles sets 
the stage for our subsequent discussion of environmental dissents. 
 
Universalizing history from fragmented experience 
A key concern of early modern European historians was to slip traditional forms of Papal 
and Imperial authority. They did so by narrating a decisive break between the 
Enlightenment and its past (see Hindess 2007; Inayatullah and Blaney 2004), but could 
not jettison so easily theology’s seductive promise of deliverance from human finitude. 
Although they successfully inoculated the Western European present against appeals to a 
dominant heritage, for many Enlightenment thinkers the future remained a repository of 
progressive promise. This resulted in early modern historical narratives utilizing 
cosmopolitical ontologies to proffer a secular gloss on Christian history’s path to the 
Rapture. To summarise, Enlightenment thinkers pursued the idea that cosmos and polis 
emanate from a single source, and drew inspiration from the increasingly successful 
mechanical depiction of the physical world. Taken together, this allowed them to 
understand the human polis as developing toward a singular and holistic endpoint located 
on a homogenized horizon (Toulmin 1990: 107).3  
 
However, this unifying view conflicted with the contemporaneous discovery of the ‘New 
World’ by European explorers. How could a single linear-progressive view account for 
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such astounding differences? The modern relationship to time and its concomitant vision 
of science provided the solution. Privileging the “here and now” allowed historical data 
to be ‘formally’ compared and fitted together without regard to chronological order so as 
to produce ‘general categories’ of social knowledge (Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 131). 
Importantly, the fashionable insistence on a general or universal criterion of evaluation 
provided a rationale for assessing a multitude of power positions  using a single rubric, 
and the temporal break accomplished by early modern historians demanded that this 
rubric be based on the present of early modern Western Europe – its “here and now” 
enjoyed priority by exemplifying “everywhere and forever”. 
 
Making a standard of their particular temporal and spatial locale allowed Western 
Europeans, and especially Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, to manage diversity 
through a new scientific method (Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 135). This method was 
normative inasmuch as a “moral science” must make practical suggestions about how and 
where (when) “human society must necessarily and appropriately go” (Blaney and 
Inayatullah 2006: 136–37). Taken together with the idea of a universal human nature, this 
moral method made possible a “conjectural history” of human kind that held clear 
cosmopolitical links to the unified, mechanistic solar system, which contained within its 
present all the necessary clues as to its future development (Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 
137; see also Hindess 2007). Conjectural history is based on three conceptual moves: the 
method of systematic comparison; the assimilation of ancient peoples and contemporary 
indigenous cultures in a “single coeval category”; and the equation of human infancy 
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with savagery (Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 139). As may be clear, the first principle 
makes possible the final two, which in turn facilitate a universal interpretation. 
 
The key claim of this “general evolutionary history of mankind” (Hindess 2007: 328), is 
that all “human cultures” can be explained in terms of development – “the workings out 
in time of certain known and stable characteristics of the human mind” (Blaney and 
Inayatullah 2006: 133). Lent an air of scientific precision by early modern encounters 
with indigenous peoples (Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 127), this “monogenist” historical 
view featured heavily in the thinking of early modern Western philosophers such as 
Immanuel Kant, and G.F.W. Hegel ( Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 128; Hindess 2007: 
325–28).5 It subsumed a plethora of differences under the umbrella of temporalized 
Difference – in this case backwardness, primitiveness, or degeneration, all of which were 
tied to the Judeo-Christian account of the fall from grace. Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 
49) sum up the Othering implications of this move quite well: 
 
The dominant aspiration … was to grasp the social world as emerging from a single 
point of origin (the Creation) and, even if currently fallen or divided, guided by 
God’s purposes and plan toward an ultimate redemption and unification. The 
commitment to a single organization and a unified teleology constructs difference 
not as an intrinsic and ubiquitous part of life, but as a fall from God’s grace … 
 
The Time(s) of the Self and the Other 
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Under a conjectural history, present indigenous cultures and the Western European past 
are conflated as monogenistically “primitive”, a category claimed to have causally 
preceded Western, modern, civilization and thus to demarcate the line between ancient 
and modern epochs (Hindess 2007: 332). This produces two relations of temporal 
Othering. First, the current Self is distinguished from contemporaneous Others. Second, 
the current Self is distinguished from the prior, antiquated Self, which is more akin to 
contemporaneous Others in its primitive, pre-modern character—a practice that contains 
whispers of Foucault’s focus on the Self’s ‘work on the Self’. 
 
Hindess (2007: 333) argues that these are ways of understanding difference in terms of 
the Self in that difference is associated with geographic (spatial) distance as well as 
historical (temporal) distance. Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 64, 56) concur: “the 
constructed temporal backwardness of the savages is equated with the imagined temporal 
origins of the European Self in antiquity and the spatially distinct Other is thereby 
converted into a temporally prior Self”. This practice buttressed colonial governance 
techniques by assigning “conquered populations” to “a different Time”, which effectively 
“submerged”  their histories “under the historical constructions of the Enlightenment 
scientist” (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004: 58; Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 142). The 
relationship between time and space in temporal Othering is important not only because it 
assigns a different development stage to spatial Others, but also because it explains 
temporal distance through spatial dispersion: geographic Others are understood as 
temporally primitive by their distribution away from the Western European core – the 
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further from the core they are found, the more “backwards” they are assumed to be 
(Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 129).  
 
Three other points are worth lodging here. First, such a clean ontological distinction 
never actually obtained in world political experience, even in the domains of dominant 
temporal Selves. By way of support for this, and second, Hindess, and Inayatullah and 
Blaney  note the many internal Others – nominally included populations differentiated by 
their primitiveness and attachment to a set of practices from the past – that attended 
modern, Western states and informed their colonial encounters. However, a corollary to 
the spatial aspect of temporal Othering is the question of how Western European and later 
North American metropoles created internal spaces in which to (re)locate their temporal 
Others. To minimize civic dissonance, modern Selves must be as homogenous as possible. 
This entails protecting the gates from the “barbarians” of the hinterland, but it also 
requires inoculating the Self time after time by placing internal Others in ancillary and 
invisible spaces within the territorial state. Examples include the Native American Trail 
of Tears, the Scottish Highlanders, Irish peasants, and Northern European pagans, and the 
institution of slavery (Hindess 2007: 334; Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 147; 
Agathangelou 2009).  
 
Second, and more important for the arguments to follow, is the metaphor of mirrors 
manifested in Othering practices, and what they present in terms of the possibilities for 
counterpower resistance. Hindess (2007: 332) describes a dialogic mirror, through which 
the Old World and current indigenous populations and practices  are used to explicate 
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each other. Blaney and Inayatullah (2006: 134) turn these mirrors on the modern Self 
through “time-shifting”, when the critique of now and here shifts first to now and there, 
and subsequently to then and there. Such reflections are typically self-congratulatory. , 
They tautologically demonstrate how far the Self has advanced to the apex of human 
history and thus serve “ to shield modern society from external critique” and establish a 
“chronocratic elite” (Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 144–45).  
 
Postcolonial theorists are concerned to deconstruct this way of thinking about difference 
but we argue that, since temporal Othering brings both contemporaneous indigenous and 
historical practices within a unified historical framework, no external critique need be 
necessary if the Other can effectively mobilize the mirror against the Self. By unifying 
practices within one framework, the practice of temporal Othering “contains built-in 
quandaries” (Steele 2010: 13). We propose in the next section that this is precisely what 
the environmental equity and capacity debates of the 1990s and 2000s demonstrate – the 
use of the Self’s temporal discourse as a mechanism of internal critique by an 
assimilating Other. But before highlighting this mechanism, one more step – also a 
metaphor – in the discourse of temporal Othering requires elaboration. 
 
Human development as metaphor 
Modern temporal discourse, which privileges the present as distinct from the past, adopts 
a unified historical interpretation, and employs Othering moves predicated on both, 
produces a vivid metaphor of civilizational development as human development. In this 
image, childhood provides the temporalized metaphor for Other – whether that is the 
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contemporaneous indigenous practices and social relations or the historically prior 
versions of the Self. The metaphor relies heavily on Adam Smith’s “stage theory” of 
human history, which explains human progress as moving from hunting and gathering, to 
shepherding, to agriculture, and ultimately to commerce, to produce a “stadial” temporal 
register of development through which all difference is understood (Blaney and 
Inayatullah 2006: 125, 137). 
 
Hindess (2007: 325, also 334-35) epitomizes the metaphor of human development using 
a quote from Friedrich von Schiller, who referred to the various levels of historical 
development in Europe’s periphery as an arrangement akin to “an adult . . . surrounded 
by children of different ages.”10 Likewise, Smith referred to the “infancy” of the 
American Indians and compared this to the “maturity” of his own industrialized, 
commercial society (Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 141). This metaphor comports with 
universal history in that it contains an aura of inclusivity, for all children have the innate 
potential to grow into adults (Hindess 2007: 326; Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 132). 
However, equating temporal Others with children subscribes them to the entire 
continuum of the development metaphor, whose inclusivity also houses its disciplinary 
potential – children not only can mature, they should “grow up”. What does this 
development look like? Commerce, read through Whig morality, is understood as the 
height of civilization, and “civility” serves as a standard by which “all the peoples of the 
world [can] be graded” (Pagden, quoted in Blaney and Inayatullah 2006: 128).  
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Globalization, especially in its industrial form, is unimaginable without economic 
development. And economic development was achieved in part by the mobilization of the 
human development metaphor to compel indigenous and agricultural societies to 
transform themselves into approximations of Western industrialized states. However, 
both the prior development of the West and the ongoing development of the “rest” have 
produced significant environmental degradation. As we discuss in the next section, 
debates about how best to address these hazards globally demonstrate ways in which 
developing nations are turning the temporalized developmental discourse of modernity 
back against its champions. 
 
(Counter)powerful possibilities: The environmental retorts of the temporal Other 
Steele’s Defacing Power (2010) engages the aesthetic bases of power – and how such 
bases can be insecuritized. He puts forth the concept of “counterpower” as “a 
micropressure, an unlimited event that can happen at any time and from any direction” 
that works to manipulate or problematize what he titles “centralized bodies of power” 
(Steele 2010: 28). The limited form of resistance embedded in counterpower, and the 
discursive material it uses, is as follows: 
 
counter-power understood in a micro-sense is displayed as moments, styles, words, 
or images. These manifestations are infinitely small and light – they do not contain 
the material or strategic force necessary to maintain influence over a body, nation, 
group or organization over time. Counter-power cannot itself distribute resources, 
taxonomize actors and actions, synthesize, coordinate or routinize. Such displays 
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derive their influence, alternatively, from the power which they engage (Steele 
2010: 20 emphasis added). 
 
Following from Foucault’s “aesthetics of the Self”, Steele suggests that one of the 
mechanisms for self-creation – the working of the Self on the Self – is a Temporal 
Othering of “past” Selves. For instance, Steele (2010) shows how the crafting of US self-
identity in the 2000s was deeply imbricated with a negative identification with a past US 
self of the Vietnam era. This Temporal Othering of and through the Self demonstrates the 
existence of fissures that can be utilized and exploited by a variety of actors. Forms of 
counterpower, including “reflexive discourse” and parrhesia (truth-telling) bring forth 
critiques internal to – within – the practices of the Self of a targeted actor. 
 
A similar potential for resistance inheres to the universalizing discourses of temporal 
progress. While such resistance is, like countepower’s potential, somewhat modest, it still 
marks an overlooked possibility in existing work on temporality and development. For 
instance, most of the accounts of temporal Othering on which we build view this process 
as disempowering to those being Othered. But current international environmental affairs 
offer an alternate picture of Others, not as “temporally superseded” (Blaney and 
Inayatullah 2006: 151) so much as politically enabled by these very discursive constraints 
to claim for themselves different levels of participation, commitment, and responsibility 
in confronting environmental problems. We examine two interrelated environmental 
debates falling under the umbrella principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibility”, which tries to balance the idea that “we are all in the same boat with 
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respect to many large-scale environmental problems, on the one hand, with an 
acknowledgement that the circumstances of individual countries differ markedly, on the 
other” (Young 2001: 168–69). The first debate, regarding environmental equity, concerns 
the different historical contributions made by developed and developing countries to 
environmental degradation. The second, regarding capacity, has to do with the different 
technological and economic capabilities with which countries can contribute to 
environmental solutions. We illustrate how developing countries’ elites and public 
commentators have re-appropriated artefacts from temporal Othering discourses to 
contest Western attempts to compel the developing world’s participation in international 
environmental regimes.11 
 
Environmental equity 
The idea of environmental equity arises from the belief of “developing countries . . . that 
it is improper for them to be asked to pitch in to solve a problem arising from the 
behavior of others” (Young 2001: 168). For example, negotiations in 1988 to reduce 
long-range transboundary air pollution failed to mandate flat-rate reductions in nitrogen 
emissions due to conflicts over equity. Although the “mandate that all countries will 
achieve an equal percentage reduction of emissions” had a first blush of equality, 
questions arose whether it was just “to expect states that historically have relatively low 
emission rates to achieve the same percentage reduction as those that have high ones” 
(Soroos 1993: 200). 
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The influence of environmental equity concerns was further demonstrated at the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro. Principle Seven of the resultant Rio Declaration states: “In view of the different 
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (UN 1992). By attaching historical contributions to environmental 
problems to the reasoning behind expectations of response, the Rio Declaration 
acknowledged that developed nations bore a greater responsibility for the existing state of 
environmental affairs than their developing neighbours. In this way, developing countries 
attached to the discourse of development a correlation between historical development 
and environmental culpability. 
 
This sense of equity was reflect in the absence of any agreement in the Rio declaration on 
a timeframe for greenhouse emissions reductions. Five years after UNCED, the United 
States was still campaigning for an emissions timeframe, angering its developing 
counterparts and leading to public reminders about common but differentiated 
responsibility (Yue 1997). In 2002, a Malaysian editorial criticizing the poor performance 
of developed countries in the decade following Rio reminded European and North 
American parties that the Declaration was based on the “principle of atoning for past 
wrongs by developed countries who brought the state of the world’s environment to 
current degraded levels through their earlier damaging industrial practices” (Loh 2002).  
 
At a recent UN Climate Change Working Group, developing states were similarly 
pointed. Bolivia (2008, 106–07) observed that developed countries were largely 
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responsible for environmental degradation from “before 1750” and that they therefore 
“owe[d] the world an ecological debt” that should be paid literally in the form of 
compensation to developing countries for “lost opportunities to Live Well” and 
figuratively by accepting greater “responsibility for addressing the crisis and its 
consequences”. Algeria (2008: 7) likewise criticized an Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change assessment report for “forgiving a major environmental debt” by 
omitting any reference to developed states’ historical responsibility. Around both the UN 
Climate Summit in Copenhagen and the UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun, 
Chinese officials similarly contended that fully industrialized states owed a “carbon debt” 
to developing states. Chinese climate change experts provided a complementary 
recommendation that any agreement should allocate “emissions rights” that “ensure 
[China’s] right to develop” (Buckley 2010). Another rising country, India, remained 
outwardly “chary of explicit emission-reduction commitments” because “mature 
economies don’t seem to have made much headway on emission reductions” (Mishra 
2009). In Copenhagen, developing delegates employed procedural tactics to obstruct 
negotiations in part because of their suspicions that developed states would attempt to 
secure lower commitments and lower penalties for themselves despite their historical 
responsibility for degradation.16 
 
By finding an opportunity in the otherwise constraining and disciplinary framework of 
development, these countries have adapted a discourse to their current engagements with 
global environmental regimes. This adaptation has subsequently been accepted for the 
most part in environmental discourse by more developed states and other powerful 
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international actors as well.17 By internalizing the idea the that certain European state 
histories prefigure developing states’ present, such reflexive reconfiguring of the 
discourse re-attaches those metropoles’ early “blooming” to a lengthy and unprecedented 
record of environmental wrongs. This counterpower practice takes as its basis the 
materiel of developing states’ presents,18 to render the human development metaphor 
Janus-faced. Such re-figuring exposes a development antithetical to the Enlightenment 
discourse of unilinear-progressivism. 
 
Environmental capacity 
Debates about the capacity of countries to contribute to environmental clean-up usually 
revolve around the argument that “poor countries, which are preoccupied with domestic 
problems like providing for the basic needs of their own citizens, are not in a position to 
make large contributions to efforts to solve transboundary or global environmental 
problems” (Young 2001: 169). The capacity gap was perhaps best epitomized in a 
trenchant remark by a Pakistani delegate at Rio that, contrary to a developed country’s 
delegate’s hope that the Declaration would be a document that “hung in every child’s 
bedroom” (Revill 1992), “in my country, most children don’t have bedrooms” (Fainaru 
1992). Likewise, the wording and ordering of principles of the Rio Declaration speak to 
the tension existing in developing countries between basic subsistence and environmental 
sustainability. It emphasises human welfare, a global “right to development”, the 
eradication of poverty rather than environmental protection, and state-by-state variations 
in environmental standards (UN 1992). Since Rio, capacity rhetoric has become fairly 
commonplace, as when Costa Rica (2008: 5) judged proposals for assisting developing 
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countries in adapting to climate change using funds drawn solely from those same 
countries as “morally unacceptable”. 
 
In addition to the economic disparities, capacity also relates to the technological gap 
between developed and developing states. Some developed countries have acknowledged 
their responsibility, directly related to their substantial “economic, technological, and 
political resources”, to participate to a greater degree in environmental protection and to 
assist poorer but willing countries who lack the material capabilities.19 This assistance 
may come in the form of investment, trade, or technological exchange, and is widely 
regarded as crucial to any chance for improving the environmental record of development 
in the twenty-first century. But many of these mechanisms, processes, and technologies 
are relatively new and conclusive results still forthcoming. Thus, there has emerged an 
interesting discursive agreement across states and capacities that both developed and 
developing countries’ market-based and technological proposals remain in their 
“infancy”.20 This suggests that in terms of their appetite for embracing more 
comprehensive solutions, temporal Selves and Others alike are more comfortable dining 
at the kids’ table. 
 
Internalization and reconstruction of temporal discourse 
A crucial feature of the above debates concerns the internalization of the basic 
developmental language, its acceptance into the everyday parlance of those who 
previously had been identified, categorised, and governed by it. By definition, 
internalization indicates a ‘taking in’ of some idea, identity, or narrative; but since those 
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who are internalizing possess creative and tactical capabilities of their own, a noteworthy 
facet of internalization is that what gets ‘taken in’ may very well not be the same when it 
comes ‘back out’ in ongoing discourse. As we will see on the question of temporal 
visions, internalization is a process both crucial to becoming a legitimate interlocutor in a 
given community and a source of contestation of that community’s working narratives. 
This might suggest that the temporal discourse of development is a merely tactical tool 
and that it is never actually internalized with any sincerity, and if complete acceptance 
were the criterion for internalization then we would agree. However, discourse also 
possesses a power of its own that constrains and enables those who use it regardless of 
their sincerity. In this way, ‘internalization’ refers to movement in both directions—
agents ‘take in’ the narrative of development but in doing so are ‘taken in’ to the world 
that it propounds, where they then can create, contest, and manoeuvre.22 While frustration 
persists about the tension between development, environmental responsibility, and the 
markers of both,23 the story of development and its embedded human development 
metaphor have now been largely internalized by all countries, signalling both the 
normative power of these ideas but also their eligibility for use in ways more transversal 
and subversive. 
 
The internalization of developmental discourse initially seems to constrain developing 
countries by limiting the agenda of debate, as exemplified by South African President 
Thabo Mbeki’s 1998 remarks to the Non-Aligned Movement in Durban. He first 
commented that the “vocabulary” of international discourse revolved around terms such 
as “globalization, liberalization, deregulation, and the information society”, and that “all 
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these processes originate from the developed countries of the North, reflect the 
imperatives of the economies and the levels of development of these countries and 
therefore, naturally, serve the purposes of our rich global neighbors”.24 Yet he 
subsequently averred that the best hope for increased agency for developing countries in 
international affairs was the “development of our economies such that we outgrow our 
designations both as developing countries and emerging economies”.25  
 
Mbeki’s statements suggest that he accepted and internalized the unilinear-progressive 
promise of development transmitted through the human development metaphor. He later 
insisted that the Organization of African Unity not engage in protectionism or command 
economy models because those would be no better than “‘King Canute wishing the 
waves away’” (Laufer 1999). This somewhat curious reference to a medieval Norseman 
during a speech about the African Renaissance indicates that Mbeki was familiar with the 
general distinction between pre-modern European history and superstition on the one 
hand and modernity and rationality on the other. Mbeki thus mobilized the European 
internal Other to exhort his African colleagues to pursue Western developmental 
benchmarks would lead to the “‘beneficial integration of the African economy into the 
global economy’” (Laufer 1999). 
 
Examples of internalization can also be found in pro forma prefatory remarks in elites’ 
speeches about the environment and development. For instance, after Nelson Mandela 
inaugurated South Africa’s independence with a poem about a child growing up in Africa 
who could now travel the world freely,27 Mbeki referred to South Africa as a “newborn 
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child” (Mbeki 2004) and to its first decade of independence as the “dawn of a new life” 
(Mbeki 1999) or a period of “infancy” (Mbeki 2001). This set the stage for later remarks 
characterizing the maturation process as a success, so that by 2006 South Africa was no 
longer a child but a “giant” who “treks on through all Africa and the whole world, 
without a pass!” (Mbeki 2006). Chinese President Jiang Zemin thought more inclusively, 
telling the Second Assembly of the Global Environment in 2002 that all of “mankind” 
remains a “child of Mother Nature”.28  
 
Environmental documents suggest the internalization of the idea that development is an 
integral aspect of a universal human history. For example, the Adaptation Fund, launched 
in 2007 at the Conference on Climate Change in Bali, facilitates contributions from 
developed countries to developing nations to fight climate change. Expected 
contributions are tied directly to countries’ levels of development which are assessed as 
falling into one of four stages – least developed, medium developing, advanced 
developing, and developed – only superficially removed from Smith’s four stages of 
civilization (Ling 2007). However, such stadial evaluations facilitate capacity-based 
assistance. Recent UN environmental reports regularly acknowledge both the capacity 
gap and the imperative of development by highlighting various programs providing 
support to developing countries seeking “to integrate climate change responses into 
national development processes” (United Nations Environment Programme 2012: 22). 
 
While all of these examples demonstrate the constraining power of a hegemonic 
developmental discourse, challenges to this discourse – discussed earlier as correlations 
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between extant levels of development and environmental responsibility – have explicitly 
mobilized the primitive-modern dichotomy as well as the child-adult metaphor to contest 
the dominant environmental regime. By way of criticizing the increasing wealth gap 
between the “North” and the “South” since the Rio Declaration, Mbeki remarked: “It is 
as though we are determined to regress to the most primitive condition of existence in the 
animal world, of the survival of the fittest”.30 He also referenced Acosta’s barbaric 
categories, denying that “human society should be constructed on the basis” of such a 
“savage principle”.31 More recently a Malaysian editorial criticized progress since the 
Kyoto Protocol of 1997 as a result of “the worst polluters . . . playing a children’s game 
of who should go first’ with regard to emissions reductions”.32 
 
Dissident invocations of primitivity and childhood turn the temporal vision of modernity 
and its developmental metaphor back upon Western progenitors by calling such visions 
into question. An additional flanking manoeuvre complementing this can be found in 
emerging contestation over the normative implications of “traditional” and “primitive” 
practices and concepts in indigenous societies. Such practices are increasingly 
characterized as intrinsically sustainable – as ancient wisdom rather than ignorant 
anachronisms (UN 1992, Prin. 22). This challenge insists that “[i]ndigenous people and 
their communities and other local communities have a vital role in environmental 
management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices” (UN 
1992).  
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As remarked earlier, the temporal discourse of modernity often acts as a mirror against 
which the primitive Other and the modern Self are understood through rigged categories 
that preclude critique of modern society. However, contestations over the benefits of 
traditional economic and developmental practices – especially those with an 
environmental dimension – disturb these supposedly settled dialogic categories and thus 
pose a challenge to modernity’s chronocratic elite. Such contestations occur in ways 
which ‘refract’ the power of the “modern” Self (Steele 2010, 35), rearranging its 
perceived legitimacy and calling the integrity of its formative narratives into question. 
Extant accounts of temporal Othering convincingly explicate its historical lineage and 
dynamics, but in doing so they fail to grasp adequately the potential for contestation 
embedded within the dominant discourse. The chronocratic elite of the Enlightenment 
may have insulated itself against external critique, but opportunities for dissent were 
intrinsic to the discourse of temporal Othering. Practitioners of international politics have 
discovered this opportunity, and continue to find ways to refashion the constrictive 
ligatures of development into lines of dissent.  
 
Conclusion: What Child is This?  
By highlighting developing countries’ challenges from within a hegemonic temporal 
discourse, we have sought in this chapter to bring forth the fluid nature of discourse in its 
ability to both constrain and enable all speakers, albeit asymmetrically Thus, like many 
cases considered in this volume, recent environmental debates pose intriguing links and 
questions to several literatures in IR theory.The largely successful counterpowerful 
retorts of those often understood as temporal Others speaks directly to the emerging 
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literature on time in IR, and suggests at least one way to augment its burgeoning 
analytical power. At its best, this literature proceeds as the works reviewed in the first 
section do, by carefully unpacking the many temporal approaches and strategies 
embedded in political theory, such as a tendency to construct world political time as 
‘unitary’ to the exclusion of any and all alternative viewpoints (Hutchings 2008). Less 
convincingly, scholars uncritically oppose a plethora of phenomena imprecisely 
subsumed under the generic phrase “linear time” (Dörre 2011, 201; Edkins 2003; 
Gallagher 2012, 76, 84; Lundborg 2011, 3; Manning 2004, 72 n17; cf. Adam 1990).  
 
In either case, scholars risk overplaying the enduring power of unified and/or ‘linear’ 
temporality. Kimberly Hutchings’ (2008) excellent critique of various political theories 
concludes with a call for “heterotemporality” or an acknowledgement of the “plurality” 
of temporalities in international politics. We believe this call has great merit, yet the case 
discussed above suggests that world political time in the modern era has been tenuously 
unified at best and that these partial and particular efforts serve (again following Steele) 
as an “aesthetic”, as one way (but by no means the only way) to smooth over political and 
historical “bumps” in the road. Thus, just as individuals use aesthetics to ‘appear’ to be 
something more composed or certain or in control, international actors use images and 
discourses for the same purpose – and those discourses, as the previous section 
demonstrates, can be exploited for strategic and tangential purposes. Thus, “regardless of 
how certain or assured” these discourses when deployed “seem to us, no matter what type 
of facade—or ‘face’—they advance, they do so to cover up a particular form of 
vulnerability” (Steele 2010, 5). Thus, in environmental temporal discourses, the source of 
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contestation may be found within the unification effort itself inasmuch as locating all 
human groups and practices along a single linear axis allows some groups to claim that 
their subordinated ‘place’ on that axis is not the time to address purportedly current and 
global problems, which presume a single moment and place in which all groups are 
located. Facile assaults on the multitudinous dimensions of ‘linear time’ tend to ignore 
this possibility altogether, treating whatever ‘linear time’ refers to as a monolithic given 
that neither matches the historical record nor acknowledges the monumental 
sociopolitical efforts required to affect such a contingent unification. 
 
None of this is to champion unitary or ‘linear’ time. We only mean to point out that as 
foils they are not omnipotent and that critical IR can benefit from further reflection on the 
implications of treating all the varieties of the human relationship to time as creative, 
intersubjective, fragile and ever-contested projects – as instances of political power. So 
far, unitary and linear time escape this treatment, but doing so would make life easier for 
critical IR, since robbing unitary or ‘linear’ time of a sense of immutable hegemony 
demotes it to just one of many ways of relating to time – a point that the retorts of 
temporalized ‘Others’ make quite well.35  
 
And yet our point about the counterpower potential of putatively hegemonic discourse 
should not be conflated with any disavowal of the material dimension of international 
politics. Rather, we view discourse and material factors as interacting continua of change. 
We have detailed at length how the temporal Othering discourse changed, but its material 
context was also in flux. Temporal Othering was extremely effective in a context of 
25 
 
geographic diffusion and imperial efflorescence, but much less so as a resource for 
developing a systemic response to emerging transnational environmental problems. Even 
as the discourse of temporal hierarchy has achieved some hegemony, material contexts 
were shifting around and underneath it in ways that left it vulnerable to rhetoric-
endogenous loopholes once a unified and egalitarian approach to environmental problems 
became necessary. Our analysis therefore lends support to a more materially sensitive and 
contingency-focused brand of social science that refuses any “sharp distinction between 
material and social realities” (Onuf 2012, 40). Instead, “the material and the social 
contaminate each other, but variably” in “recursive” interactions between agents and 
structures (Onuf 2012, 58). 
 
One final point reminiscent of political realism is that wherever and however power goes 
tragic possibilities follow.36 Despite empowering “child” states and hoisting “adult” 
states on their own rhetorical petard, the temporal retorts discussed here do not move us 
closer to a global solution to environmental degradation, as the recent litany of failed 
meetings, summits, and protocols makes clear. This is in no way to lay blame on 
developing states for international inaction. Rather there is the distinct possibility that 
discourses manifesting myriad dimensions of power and embracing a plurality of 
international political times may concatenate with (and within) enfeebled hegemonic 
constructs to increase the likelihood that the international community will find itself 
facing a time decisively unified by a dearth of inhabitable space. 
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Endnotes 
                                                
3 Essentially, modern time and universal history allowed Enlightenment thinkers to have their 
King Cake and eat it too—stifling legitimacy claims based on the past were jettisoned, while the 
alluring promise of a Divinely-written future remained. 
5 This specific historical step exemplifies the overall development omitted in (Prozorov 2011). 
10 Schiller portrayed distant peoples as “belonging to an earlier time . . . less than fully mature . . . 
their intellectual and moral capacities . . . relatively underdeveloped” (Hindess 2007: 326). 
11 The debates discussed in this section are drawn almost exclusively from public discourse. For 
academic treatments, consult (Goodin 1990; Jakobsen 1999; Shue 1999; Young 2001).  
16 (Climate Talks Resume after Hours-Long Boycott 2009). 
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17 (Remarks by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in an Address to the High-Level 
Segment of the UN Climate Change Conference 2007). 
18 Steele renders counterpower as ‘an unlimited event that can happen at any time and from any 
direction, it cannot be predicted and therefore preempted’ (Steele 2010: 30).  It is a challenge to 
the aesthetic ‘layers’ of power, disturbing but not overcoming or comprehensively altering the 
power being challenged. 
19 (Nations from Four Continents Call for Greenhouse Gas Reductions 1997). 
20 (Remarks by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in an Address to the High-Level 
Segment of the UN Climate Change Conference 2007; Wu and Wang 2010; Lovell 2012). 
22 For further discussion of internalization, see (Steele 2008: 151); for a more submissive view 
related to Althusser’s interpellation, see (Debrix 1999: 121-22). For further discussion of 
narrative worlds, see (Hom 2013). 
23 For instance, ‘power plants, factories, and motor vehicles’ are both the “major sources of air 
pollution” and the “benchmark of how ‘advanced’ a country is” (Yue 1997). 
24 (South Africa’s Mbeki Addresses Non-Aligned Movement Ministerial Meeting 1998). 
25 (South Africa’s Mbeki Addresses Non-Aligned Movement Ministerial Meeting 1998 emphasis 
added). 
27 The poem by Ingrid Jonker, entitled “The child (who was shot dead by soldiers at Nyanga)”, is 
quoted in (Mandela 1994). 
28 (President Jiang Zemin Addresses Global Environmental Facility Meeting 2002). 
30 (Environment and Sustainable Development; Translating the Dream of Sustainable 
Development into Reality 2002). 
31 (Environment and Sustainable Development; Translating the Dream of Sustainable 
Development into Reality 2002). 
32 (What’s Next after Kyoto 2007). 
35 For example, see (Hom 2010). 
36 For an extended discussion of the temporal features of classical realism and its recent, reflexive 
incarnations, see (Hom and Steele 2010). 
